Afghanistan -- The Other Side

A few days ago I gave a lengthy set of reasons why we could not win in Afghanistan (implying that we should get out as fast as possible). I mentioned the problems with Karzai's weak, corrupt, and unpopular government; the tribal/feudal nature of Afghan society; resentment toward outsiders of any sort; and the impossibility -- even with a large high-tech army -- of defeating a passionate rag-tag army of insurgents who travel light and know the country. I think all these arguments are valid.
But then there's the other side (isn't there always?), all having to do with what happens if/when we leave.
1) Will the Taliban take over the whole country again? Most likely, unless we can somehow structure things to prevent it.
2) If the Taliban again takes control, will Al-Quaeda resume using Afghanistan as a base for training and operations? Same answer.
3) What will happen to civilians that have cooperated with us, or to girls and women? Unless we can leave a stable decent government in place, many innocent people will suffer and die at the hands of the Taliban.
So what do we do? It's stupid to stay, and it would be wrong to leave. Great choices.
A columnist in the Raleigh N&O suggested several things: 1) Don't accept the recent stolen election. Put all kinds of pressure on Karzai. If the country had a government that a majority of citizens had chosen and therefore had some confidence in, there might be a chance that the central government would have some authority and might create some stability in the whole country or much of it. 2) While beefing up Afghan forces, the US and its allies should operate with extreme accuracy and precision in removing Al-Quaeda and Taliban leadership. 3) I'm not sure if this point was in the article, but I think it is imperative -- spelling out the preceding point -- that we minimize civilian deaths -- "collateral damage" -- because every civilian death may well translate into three or five or ten recruits for the insurgents. 4) If foreigners -- we and our allies -- must stay in the country, we need to be as inconspicuous as possible. For some insurgents (and prospective insurgents), the very sight of "invaders" arouses them to resistance.